symbol " [~] " and the formula " [F] " is the formula "[~F]", and juxtaposing the symbol " [v] " between the formulas "[F]" and " [G] " is the formula " [FvG] ".
The numerical functions and relations in the following are defined explicitly by Gödel [Go31a] . The formulas are defined implicitly by his reasoning.
Definitions
We take P to be Gödel's formal system, and define ( [Go31a] , Theorem VI, p24-25):
(i) Q(x, y) as Gödel's recursive numerical relation ~xB(Sb(y 19|Z(y))).
(ii) [R(x, y)] as a formula that represents Q(x, y) in the formal system P.
(The existence of such a formula follows from Gödel's Theorem VII [Go31a] .) (iii) q as the Gödel-number of the formula [R(x, y)] of P. (R(x, y) is defined by Gödel's Theorem VII [Go31a] , where it is proved instantiationally equivalent to Q(x, y).)
Gödel's Lemmas
In the proof of his Theorem VI, Gödel [Go31a] proves the following lemmas:
Lemma 2: xB(17Genr) => Bew(Neg Sb(r 17|Z(x)))
Gödel's meta-Lemmas
He then proves the following meta-lemmas:
Meta-lemma 1: Bew(17Genr) => Bew(Neg Sb(r 17|Z(n))) holds for some natural number n.
Meta-lemma 2: Bew(17Genr) => ~Bew(17Genr) holds, if P is assumed consistent. Meta-Lemma 3: ~nB(17Genr) holds for any natural number n, if P is assumed consistent.
Meta-lemma 4:
Bew(Neg(17Genr)) => ~Bew(Neg(17Genr)) holds, assuming P is omega-consistent.
Gödel's conclusions and consequences
From these Gödel concludes that ~Bew(17Genr) holds if P is assumed consistent. Hence 17Gen is not P-PROVABLE 6 , and, ipso facto, [(Ax)R(x, p)] is not P-provable, if P is assumed consistent.
He also concludes that ~Bew(Neg(17Genr)) holds if P is assumed omega-consistent.
Hence Neg(17Genr) is not P-PROVABLE, and, ipso facto, [~(Ax)R(x, p)] is not Pprovable, if P is assumed omega-consistent.
P is not omega-consistent

Meta-Theorem 1: P is not omega-consistent
Proof: Since 17Genr is the Gödel-number of the formula [(Ax)R(x, p)]:
] is P-provable, then nB(17Genr) holds for some natural number n.
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(ii) Hence, by Lemma 2:
6 The web-version [Go31b] of Gödel's paper uses italics instead of CAPITALS to refer to metamathematical concepts in assertions where the formulas of P are referred to by their Gödel-numbers. 7 In a companion essay [An02] , where I review Gödel's and Rosser's non-formal meta-reasoning of undecidability, I argue that this "semantic" meta-equivalence is equivalent to the "non-semantic" metaassertion:
where [Bew(Neg Sb(r 17|Z(n)))] is the formula of P whose interpretation is the proposition obtained when we substitute a given natural number n for the variable x in the recursive relation Bew(Neg Sb(r 17|Z(x))). I argue that §1.6(ii) and (iii) can similarly be expressed as "non-semantic" P-provable metaassertions.
If [(Ax)R(x, p)] is P-provable, then Bew(Neg Sb(r 17|Z(n))) holds for some natural number n.
(iii) Since Neg Sb(r 17|Z(n)) is the Gödel-number of [~R(n, p)], we have that:
If Bew(Neg Sb(r 17|Z(n))) holds for some natural number n, then [~R(n, p)] is P-provable for some numeral [n].
(iv) We thus have the meta-inferences:
We now appeal to an extension of the Deduction Theorem (see Appendix 1), and conclude that:
(vi) By the logical axioms of P, it follows that:
(viii) Now, from Meta-lemma 3 we have:
[R(n, p)] is P-provable for some numeral [n].
(ix) It follows from (vi) and (viii) that P is not omega-consistent.
Conclusion
We conclude that, if we admit meta-mathematical arguments of provability, then P is not omega-consistent (we note an interesting interpretation of this in Appendix 2).
Appendix 1: An "extended" Deduction Theorem
In §1.6(v), we appeal to the following argument for an "extended" interpretation of the Deduction Theorem.
Deduction Theorem: From "If [A] is P-provable, then [B] is P-provable" we may conclude "([A] => [B]) is P-provable", where [A], [B] are propositions in P.
Proof: The meta-deduction "If [A] is P-provable, then [B] is P-provable", where [A], [B]
are propositions in P, implies that there is some finite sequence of P-formulas, [ Hence, an extended interpretation of the Deduction Theorem becomes necessary, unless we deny validity to meta-mathematical reasoning for establishing that a formula, or a class of formulas, of P is provable. However, this would then deny validity to Gödel's meta-mathematical Lemmas, from which he concludes his Theorem VI.
Appeal to an extended Deduction Theorem is also explicit in Mendelson's version ( [Me64] , p146, proposition 3.32) of Rosser's argument 9 for the construction of undecidable propositions in a consistent P.
Appendix 2: A constructive interpretation of "(Ax)F(x)" and a solution to Hilbert's Entscheidungsproblem for P
The omega-inconsistency of P has an interesting, constructive, interpretation that yields a negative proof of Hilbert's Entscheidungsproblem for P.
The classical Platonist interpretation
It follows from §1.6(viii) that the interpretation R(n, p) of [R(n, There is some natural number n for which R(n, p) does not hold, 9 However, Mendelson's version appears to apply the extended Deduction Theorem invalidly. Assuming that r is a PROOF of a given FORMULA n, it seems to make the invalid assumption, "[r]=<x is Pprovable", as the premise in the application of the extended Deduction Theorem.
(We use the notation "=<" to to denote the symbol that interprets as "equal to or less than".)
Then Meta-theorem 1 has the uncomfortable consequence that the standard interpretation of P is inconsistent.
A constructive interpretation of Generalisation
However, we can also consider the constructive, and intuitionistically unobjectionable, interpretation (Ax)F(x) as the meta-assertion:
There is a general, x-independent, routine to establish that F(x) holds for all x.
In other words, we take the standard interpretation of [(Ax)F(x)] as the assertion that we can always construct a Turing machine T, independent of n, which can decide that F(n) holds for any given natural number n.
We note that Generalisation ([Me64], p57) would then interpret as a constructive, and intuitionistically unobjectionable, Rule of Inference.
Hilbert's Entscheidungsproblem
So, if we interpret P constructively, we would conclude from §1.6(vi) and §1.6(viii) that whereas, given any natural number n, we can always find some n-dependent method to establish that R(n, p) holds, we cannot find a general n-independent method to establish that R(n, p) holds for any, or all n.
In other words, given any natural number n, we can always construct a Turing machine T(n), that depends on n, which will decide whether the interpretation R(n, p) of [R(n, p)] holds or not. However, we cannot construct a Turing machine T that is independent of n, and which will decide, for any given n as input, whether R(n, p) holds or not.
Thus the omega-inconsistency of P can be seen as a constructive, and intuitionistically unobjectionable, negative proof of Hilbert's Entscheidungsproblem under a constructive standard interpretation for P.
